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Abstract10
Culture has an extraordinary influence on human behaviour, unparalleled in other11
species. Some theories propose that humans possess learning mechanisms biologically12
selected specifically for social learning, which function to promote rapid enculturation. If13
true, it follows that information acquired via observation of another’s activity might be14
responded to differently, compared with equivalent information acquired through one’s15
own exploration, and that this should be the case in even very young children. To inves-16
tigate this, we compared children’s responses to information acquired either socially, or17
from personal experience. The task we used allowed direct comparison between these al-18
ternative information sources, as the information value was equivalent across conditions,19
which has not been true of previous methods used to tackle similar questions. Across two20
18mo-5yo samples (recruited in the UK and China) we found that children performed sim-21
ilarly following information acquired from social demonstrations, comparedwith personal22
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experience. Children’s use of the information thus appeared independent of source. Fur-23
thermore, children’s suboptimal performance showed evidence of a consistent bias driven24
bymotivation for exploration as well as exploitation, which was apparent across both con-25
ditions and in both samples. Our results are consistent with the view that apparent pecu-26
liarities identified in human social information use could be developmental outcomes of27
general-purpose learning and motivational biases, as opposed to mechanisms that have28
been biologically selected specifically for the acquisition of cultural information.29
Keywords— social learning; cumulative cultural evolution; learningmechanisms; humanbehaviour;30
child development31
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1 Introduction34
Much of human behaviour (including basic survival skills, e.g. Henrich and McElreath, 2003) is depen-35
dent on cumulative cultural evolution, a process of cultural change which produces traits that are in-36
creasingly functional and advantageous to their users (Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 1999; Caldwell37
and Millen, 2008). Cumulative culture is pervasive across all human societies, yet is widely regarded as38
being absent in other species (e.g. Tennie et al., 2009; Dean et al., 2014; though see Laland and Hoppitt,39
2003; Mesoudi and Thornton, 2018; Caldwell et al., 2020 for discussion of how some examples of non-40
human culture have been considered cumulative). Identifying the reasons for this apparently unique41
human capacity has been the focus of a substantial body of research. Proposed explanations have in-42
cluded humans having a unique set of socio-cognitive abilities (Dean et al., 2012, 2014), or they have43
considered the importance of potentially species-unique factors such as high-fidelity copying (Horner44
andWhiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; Whiten et al., 2009) and explicit metacognition (Shea et al., 2014;45
Dunstone and Caldwell, 2018), amongst others.46
A focus on humans’ extraordinary dependence on cultural inputs, and the distinctive elaborateness47
of human cultural traits, has led many theorists to suggest — or, as noted by Heyes (2012b), to appear48
to simply assume — that human social learning is distinct from human asocial, or individual, learning.49
That is, that theremay be biologically-selected social-learning-specificmechanisms (e.g.Meltzoff, 1988,50
1999; Tomasello, 1999; Herrmann et al., 2007;McGuigan et al., 2007; Hill et al., 2009; Tennie et al., 2009;51
Whiten, 2011; Dean et al., 2014; Henrich, 2016; Tennie et al., 2016). These function to concentrate naive52
minds on the abundance of social information that surrounds them, promoting rapid enculturation.53
Humans’ adept use of social information and the acquisition of species-specific cultural content54
may have been (at least in part) selected due to the fitness advantages that these convey. For example,55
prioritising social informationwill be advantageous where social information is quantifiablymore useful56
or important relative to direct personal experience, which will particularly be the case for certain types57
of cultural trait such as tool or language use, or in caseswhere direct personal experience ismore risky to58
obtain. And in the case of some cultural traits, such as cultural norms and rituals, information available59
from others’ activity or instructionmay be the only means by which they can be acquired. The nature of60
this selection, and the extent towhich it is a biological selection process as opposed to being an outcome61
of a person’s development (see, e.g., Barrett, 2019, for discussion), however, is not yet clear. Any special62
status granted to social information could therefore arise for different reasons. Toward one end of a63
continuum it could be largely independent of experience, in the way that, for example, smiling (which64
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is even present in blind babies; Freedman, 1964; Valente et al., 2018) and social tolerance develop65
with little or no input (see Heyes, 2018, 2019, for review and discussion). Toward the other end of the66
continuum, special treatment of social information could be relatively experience-dependent, as, for67
example, literacy is (Heyes and Frith, 2014). However, many theorists suggest, or assume, that there are68
social-learning-specific processes for learning from others, functioning to promote rapid enculturation,69
which are present from birth (Tomasello, 1999; Tennie et al., 2009; Dean et al., 2014; Henrich, 2016;70
Tennie et al., 2016), i.e. that are, at least relatively, independent of a person’s experience.71
If there are social-learning-specific processes, then it follows that information acquired via obser-72
vation of another’s activity might be responded to differently, compared with equivalent information73
acquired through one’s own exploration. Studies involving human adults have indeed suggested dif-74
ferences in the treatment of information dependent on its source, with greater weight being given to75
information acquired through personal experience at the expense of making full use of available social76
information (e.g.McElreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2007; Eriksson and Strimling, 2009; Novaes Tump77
et al., 2018). However, identifying differences in individual and social information use in adults does not78
tell us the age at which such differences emerge. If there are social-learning-specific responses which79
are relatively independent of an individual’s experience (i.e. they would be present even with only lim-80
ited social and asocial learning), then a different treatment of social, relative to individual, information81
should be evident in even very young children. Alternatively, if social-learning-specific responses are82
more experience dependent, then different treatment of information acquired socially and individually83
should be less evident in younger children, but should develop with age.84
This raises the question of whether young children do respond to social inputs in fundamentally85
different ways, relative to information obtained through their own direct personal experience, and if86
they do, at what age this specialisation develops. To test this, it is crucial to compare treatment of social87
and individual information when the value of the information obtained is equivalent, i.e. when the only88
difference in the information is its source. Human social learning has been characterised as a “high89
fidelity” transmission process, in this respect distinct from lower resolution social influence observed90
in other species (e.g. Tennie et al., 2009). It has also been proposed that high-fidelity copying may91
represent a functional adaptation, selected for the ability to accelerate the transmission of potentially92
beneficial, but causally opaque, cultural traits (e.g. Herrmann et al., 2007; Lyons et al., 2007; Whiten93
et al., 2009). Yet do children repeat socially learned behaviours with more “high fidelity” than they94
repeat those they learn through personal exploration? There is also the question of whether children95
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are particularly attentive to social information, and able to learn from it as proficiently (or possibly96
even more so) as they do from their own experience. These are fundamental predictions which remain97
untested in the literature, yet examining young children’s treatment of equivalent social and individual98
information has the potential to shed light on the extent to which the apparent peculiarities of human99
social information use are relatively experience independent or experience dependent.100
Comparison of children’s responses to equivalent information acquired either socially or from per-101
sonal experience is virtually impossible to address using the standard methodological approaches em-102
ployed in the study of children’s social learning (e.g. puzzle-box apparatuses, or tool-use tasks, e.g.103
Lyons et al., 2007; Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010; Flynn et al., 2016) in which possible solutions are nec-104
essarily constrained by the physical structure, and what is learned is generalisable information which105
would apply across multiple encounters with the same object, as well as others similar to it. This means106
that even if participants have not encountered a specific apparatus before, it is not possible to control107
for their baseline expectations about correct or appropriate responses, nor is it possible to assume that108
information from a social source, or from personal experience, should be equally weighted. Children’s109
prior experience with similar objects will influence the strength of their expectations about possible110
responses and their likely effectiveness, and therefore the extent to which they respond to personal111
feedback. In addition, their prior experience of imitating others’ actions in similar contexts will influ-112
ence the extent to which they take into account the apparent effects of another’s actions within the113
experimental paradigm (e.g. the child is likely to have experienced positive consequences associated114
with copying others’ actions even when the effect or purpose of the action may have been opaque).115
Therefore, in relation to the likelihood of repeating actions that do not directly produce a desired out-116
come (or indeed those that do), a fair comparison cannot usually bemadebetween the effect of learning117
this via personal experience versus a social demonstration.118
Furthermore, although children will bring different expectations to any experimental task regarding119
the value of information from a social source compared with their own exploration (and past experi-120
ence means they are likely to, regardless of the task in question), in these standard methodological121
paradigms it is not possible to systematically study the extent to which new experiences update weight-122
ings assigned to these expectations. Since what is learned is generalisable knowledge, updating from123
the carry-over of experiences themselves (i.e. effective and ineffective responses) cannot easily be sep-124
arated fromupdating of the strategy (i.e. when to copy or persist with responses observed or attempted125
previously, and when to deviate from these). Indeed, within methodological paradigms which involve126
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learning how to operate physical apparatuses, there is generally no way of specifying a categorical and127
finite set of possible responses that might be performed, since these are continuous, and the problem128
space itself is ill-defined. Thismakes it difficult to equate the information value available from observing129
or experiencing a response that generates a desirable outcome, from one that appears not to do so. An130
action seen to produce a desirable outcomemight well be expected to be repeated, and at a higher rate131
than would be expected given no such experience. However, it does not follow that an action with a132
more ambiguous outcome should be avoided, or indeed how to quantify the possible alternatives and133
their respective baseline probabilities.134
In this study we therefore use an abstract stimulus choice task, for which information acquired per-135
sonally or sociallywas only episodic, that is, specific to a particular problem (i.e. particular set of stimuli),136
with the critical test trial occurring directly after the initial information trial. The reward structure is ex-137
plicit, with the reward arbitrarily assigned to one of the response options. The predictive relationship138
between the information trial and test trial is also consistent. Therefore, assuming participants have139
understood or been able to learn this task structure, in a binary choice the information trial (whether140
rewarded or unrewarded) provides unambiguous information about the location of the reward. The141
task also allows us to directly manipulate the baseline probability of making a particular response over142
the possible alternatives simply by varying the number of stimuli, and therefore the potential responses.143
This allows us to investigate the generalisability of response patterns, in determining whether a particu-144
lar response pattern is carried over from one version of the task (such as the binary choice task in Stage145
A of Experiments 1–2 described below) to another (such as the three-stimulus choice task in Stage B146
of Experiments 1–2). Finally, since the stimuli are arbitrary, and the reward location is randomly as-147
signed, multiple problems can be presented to the same participant, as any carry-over effects linked to148
the structure of the stimuli themselves (e.g. same side, or similar shape or colour as another previously149
associated – or not – with a reward) should have no systematic influence on the child’s likelihood of150
selecting one of the responses over another. Thus we can study the effect of repeated experience of151
multiple problems on learning the optimal response strategy (i.e. win-stay, lose-shift for Experiments152
1–2, although c.f. Experiment 3).153
Discrimination learning tasks such as the one we use here have been widely used in comparative154
as well as developmental psychology, and have provided evidence of the formation of learning sets in155
children and nonhuman primates (e.g. Harlow, 1949; Levinson and Reese, 1967). Studies of preschool156
children have thus far focused on learning from personal experience only (information trial and test trial157
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both completed by the participant), but these indicate that children can successfully apply a win-stay,158
lose-shift rule, and show improved performance with increasing task experience. In the experiments159
reported here, we directly compare the test trial performance of children who made their own infor-160
mation trial selections with the performance of those who observed information trials performed by161
the experimenter. Thus we exploit the fact that the information trial always provides definitive, but162
problem-specific, information about reward location, as a means to compare the efficacy of use of so-163
cial and individual informationwhen these have directly (and transparently) equivalent predictive value.164
Our experimentalmanipulation therefore is the source of the information, with the context of acqui-165
sition and the predictive value of that information equivalent in each condition. In keeping everything166
constant except for the source of the information, note that both of our conditions involve the child167
learning in a context that is social: in both cases the child is presented with the task by a researcher168
in a social setting. Nevertheless, there are fundamental differences between the conditions which we169
may expect to lead to different patterns of behaviour if social-learning-specific responses are relatively170
experience independent. In the Individual condition, it is the child who chooses which of the stimuli to171
select in the information trial, and the child who physically makes, and receives direct feedback on, that172
selection. In the Social condition, the child cannot influence which stimulus is selected in the informa-173
tion trial, and they passively observe the selection being made by the researcher; instead of receiving174
direct feedback, they receive vicarious observation of another’s feedback. If the source of information175
influences a child’s use of that information, as we may predict if social-learning-specific responses are176
relatively independent of experience, then there are a number of ways we may see evidence for it in177
our experimental results. Firstly, children’s performancemay be better overall in one condition over the178
other, i.e. they may (in Experiments 1–2) behavemore in accordance with a win-stay, lose-shift strategy179
and locate the reward more often in the test trial in either the Social or Individual condition. If specific180
processes which focus children specifically on social information are relatively experience independent,181
then task successmay be greater in the Social condition overall in even the youngest children. Secondly,182
if young children possess mechanisms, serving to promote the rapid acquisition of potentially opaque183
traits, which lead to a tendency to specifically copy other individuals with relatively high fidelity, then184
wemay see a greater tendency to repeat the information trial selections in the Social condition relative185
to the Individual condition. We may see evidence of this overall, i.e. greater repetition of the informa-186
tion trial selection in the Social condition relative to the Individual condition regardless of whether the187
information trial was rewarded (more win-stay behaviour) or unrewarded (more lose-stay behaviour).188
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Alternatively, a greater tendency to repeat the information trial selection in the Social conditionmay be189
conditional on the type of information trial selection, i.e. there may be a greater amount of repetition190
following rewarded information trials in the Social condition relative to the Individual condition, but191
not following unrewarded information trials, or vice versa. Thirdly, we may see evidence for changes192
in the relative responses to Social or Individual information trials over the course of the experiment. If193
children do respond to information differently dependent on its source, then we may see overall task194
success increase with task experience in one condition to a greater extent than the other. Finally, we195
may see effects of child age, with differential use of information acquired socially versus individually196
affected by experience. If social-learning-specific processes employed for learning from social sources197
are more experience dependent, then wemay see stronger evidence of any condition-specific biases in198
the Social condition compared to the Individual condition to a greater extent in the older children.199
2 Experiment 1: Children’s use of socially and individually ac-200
quired information (UK)201
2.1 Methods202
Each child was allocated to either the Individual or Social condition, and completed a series of problems203
over two stages (A and B).204
In Stage A, there were up to 10 problems, each a binary discrimination task consisting of an infor-205
mation trial (IT) and a test trial (TT). Across both trials for a particular problem, the same pair of two206
simple geometric stimuli were presented. An example problem is illustrated in Figure 1.207
In the IT in the Individual condition, the child would select one of the two stimuli, and the selec-208
tion would be revealed to the child as either unrewarded or rewarded. Of the 10 possible problems,209
five were rewarded and five unrewarded, in a randomised order. Following an unrewarded selection,210
both stimuli were removed for 2 seconds. Following a rewarded selection, both stimuli were removed,211
with the selected stimulus replaced by an image of a cartoon monkey for 2 seconds, accompanied by a212
recording of a chimpanzee vocalisation.213
The IT was then immediately followed by the TT. The same two stimuli were presented in the same214
positions, and the child was encouraged to select the stimulus which would reveal the monkey. The215





Figure 1: Example Stage A problem. In the IT, the child is shown two stimuli and one of these
is selected, by either the child (Individual condition) or the experimenter (Social condition;
illustrated above with the top hand being the researcher’s and the bottom being the child’s).
Here, the left stimulus is selected, and is unrewarded. In the TT, the child is shown the same
two stimuli in the same positions, and encouraged to select the rewarded stimulus. Here, they
lose-shift, select the rewarded stimulus, and reveal the reward. The banana at the top of the
screen indicates that they now have a running score of 1 consecutively rewarded TT. The hands
shown here are for illustration purposes only.
would be to select the same stimulus; following an unrewarded IT, to select the alternative stimulus,217
and a correct selectionwould again reveal themonkeywith the accompanying recording. Stage A ended218
after 10 problems or (tomaintain engagement in childrenwho demonstrated high proficiency) after five219
consecutive successful TTs.220
Stage B followed the same procedure as Stage A, except it was a three-way discrimination task, with221
the three stimuli placed on the left, centre, and right side of the screen. As discussed above, increasing222
the number of stimuli in this way allowed us to investigate any changes in the response patterns when223
the number of potential responses was varied. As before, the monkey was always in the same position224
in the TT as it was in the IT for each problem. Following a rewarded IT, the correct response would be to225
select the same stimulus (win-stay), which would always reveal themonkey (as in Stage A). Following an226
unrewarded IT, the correct response would be to select one of the two alternative stimuli (lose-shift),227
and so the participantwould have a 50% chance of finding themonkey. Children completed 10 problems228
regardless of howmany TTs were rewarded consecutively. As before, five of the ITs were rewarded and229
five unrewarded, in a randomised order.230
In the Social condition, the procedure was the same, except the experimenter, rather than the par-231
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ticipant, made the selection in the IT. The stimulus selected in each case was determined by a randomly232
generated list. As with the Individual condition, of the 10 possible problems, five were rewarded and233
five unrewarded, in a randomised order.234
See SI 4 for additional methodological details.235
To assess the effects of task experience on optimal use of the IT cues, we analysed “task success”236
(encompassing both re-selection of a stimulus following a rewarded IT, and selection of an alternative237
stimulus following an unrewarded IT) during Stage A problems. To investigate the fidelity with which238
children reproduced an IT selection, we compared “repeats” (including all re-selections of stimuli se-239
lected during the IT) across Stages A and B.240
Note that we did not preregister any predictions for Experiments 1–2 (our research group only be-241
gan to preregister studies as a matter of course at a time when the first two experiments had already242
been completed). We did, however, make two key predictions. Firstly, we predicted that task success243
would increase with age andwith problem number. Secondly, we expected that any different treatment244
of information dependent on its source would be relatively experience-dependent, and so we antici-245
pated that if there were any differences in task success or repeating behaviour between our conditions,246
they would become increasingly evident with age. We made no directional predictions in respect of247
source effects, however.248
2.2 Participants249
We collected data from 172 children aged 5 and under in Glasgow, UK. See SI 4 for additional details250
of the data collection and a full breakdown of participants by age and population (alongside those for251
Experiments 2–3). The ethical approaches of this study were reviewed and granted approval by the252
General University Ethics Panel of the University of Stirling.253
2.3 Results254
The analyses we report throughout are planned analyses, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Both suc-255
cess and repeats measures were binary coded: a successful TT was 1, and 0 otherwise; a TT repeat was256
1, and 0 otherwise.257
In the first analysis, we investigated how task success varied with problem number, and the in-258
teraction between problem number and source, and also how task success was influenced by source,259
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information type, age, and their interactions. Of the 172 children, 41 (24%) located the reward in each260
of the first five problems of Stage A, and so completed no further Stage A problems (see SI 2.1.1 formore261
details). For between-subject comparison purposes therefore, our analysis of task success considered262
only the first five problems of Stage A, which are illustrated in Figure 2 alongside proportion repeats and263
the results of Experiments 2-3. Analysis of success in Stage B is in SI 2.1.2, and an illustration of repeats264
for all the Stage A and B data is in SI 1.265
All analyses involved generalised linear mixed effects models with logit link using R (R Core Team,266
2013) and lme4 (Bates et al., 2013), taking p-values < .05 as statistically significant. Where significant267
interaction terms involving source and age were indicated, we investigated the effect of source on the268
younger (under 4 years old) and older (4 and over) children post hoc, by repeating our analysis on the269
two subsets of the data separately. Model details for all analyses of Experiments 1–3 are given in SI 2.270
2.3.1 Task success271
Task success was above chance (M = 0.73, SD = 0.21, p < .001; see SI Table 1, SI 2.1.1). In the Individ-272
ual condition, average task success was 0.55 (SD = 0.38) following rewarded ITs and 0.90 (SD = 0.24)273
following unrewarded ITs. In the Social condition, average task success was 0.56 (SD = 0.38) following274
rewarded ITs and 0.89 (SD = 0.24) following unrewarded ITs.275
There was no evidence of an overall effect of source (p = .519). Task success was greater following276
unrewarded ITs compared to rewarded ITs (p < .001), and this was more pronounced in older children277
(information type x age interaction: p < .001). Success increased with problem number (p = .001) and278
with age (p < .001). There was an interaction effect between source and age indicating that the effect279
of age was more pronounced in the Individual condition (p = .016). There were no other significant280
interaction terms (p≥ .295).281
We followed up the source by age interaction by rerunning our analysis within each of the younger282
and older age groups (see SI Figure 2 for illustration of mean task success by age group and source).283
Although the trends were in opposite directions, the effect of source was not significant in either the284
younger (p = .171; SI Table 2) or older (p = .061; SI Table 3) children. Therewere no interactions involving285
source in either subset (p≥ .217).286
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Figure 2: Task success by source and problem number (top row) and proportion of repeats
by age (whole years) and information type (bottom row) for Problems 1–5 of Stage A for
Experiments 1–3. Task success error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Proportion repeats ar-
rows indicatewhether repeats or non-repeats increase task success for a given experiment and
information type: for Experiments 1–2, repeats following rewarded ITs increase task success,
while non-repeats following unrewarded ITs increase task success; this pattern is reversed for
Experiment 3. For ease of comparison between task success and repeats, both plots are based
only on Stage A Problems 1–-5, although the statistical analysis of repeats was based on the
entire data set of all Stage A and B problems. See SI 1 for proportion of repeats for the entire
data set. Dashed lines indicate chance performance.
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2.3.2 Repeats287
In the second analysis, we investigated how the likelihood of repeating the IT selection in the TT was288
influenced by information type, stage, age, and source, and all interactions. This analysis was based on289
our entire dataset of all Stage A and B problems.290
Overall, the proportion of repeats was 0.35 (SD = 0.17). In the Individual condition, average propor-291
tion of repeats was 0.65 (SD = 0.29) following rewarded ITs and 0.09 (SD = 0.17) following unrewarded292
ITs. In the Social condition, average proportion of repeats was 0.60 (SD = 0.31) following rewarded ITs293
and 0.08 (SD = 0.15) following unrewarded ITs.294
There was no evidence of an overall effect of source (p = .454; SI Table 5). Children’s overall rates of295
repetition were not significantly different between Stage A (M = 0.35, SD = 0.21) and Stage B (M = 0.36,296
SD = 0.18, p = .739). This is in spite of the chance-level probability of repeating an IT selection in the TT297
being different between Stages A and B (50% vs. 33%). There were more repeats following rewarded298
ITs (Stage A: M = 0.62, SD = 0.33; Stage B: M = 0.65, SD = 0.33) compared to unrewarded ITs (Stage A:299
M = 0.09, SD = 0.19; Stage B: M = 0.07, SD = 0.17, p < .001).300
Older children repeated less overall than younger (p < .001), and this effect was more pronounced301
following unrewarded ITs (information type x age interaction: p < .001). There were no two-way in-302
teractions involving source (p ≥ .202), although there was a three-way interaction involving source,303
information type, and age (p = .048), consistent with the source by age interaction on task success (re-304
ported above). Once again we followed up this interaction involving source and age by rerunning our305
models on both the younger and older age groups (see SI Figure 3). In the younger group, there was306
no main effect of source (p = .602; SI Table 6) and no interaction involving source (p ≥ .055). In the307
older group, there was again no main effect of source (p = .561; SI Table 7), but there was a significant308
interaction between source and information type (p = .021). Again in line with our task success analysis,309
this indicates that the increased tendency to repeat following rewarded ITs relative to unrewarded ITs310
was more pronounced in the Individual condition in this age group. There were no other interactions311
involving source (p≥ .453).312
2.4 Discussion313
We found no evidence of any difference in overall success rates between the Social and Individual con-314
ditions. And although success rates were higher for later problems, there was also no evidence that315
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this strategy-learning effect was any stronger for one condition over another. Overall, children’s TT per-316
formance was above chance, regardless of the source and type of information to which they were ex-317
posed. They tended to repeat rewarded responses, and deviate from those that had been unrewarded,318
regardless of whether the informationwas acquired socially or individually. Childrenweremore likely to319
deviate from unrewarded responses than they were to repeat rewarded ones. This was true across the320
full age range, and in both the Social and Individual conditions. We return to this bias and test a possi-321
ble explanation for its prevalence in Experiment 3. Performance on three-way discrimination problems322
(presented after the two-way discrimination problems) was also well above chance, and the tendency323
to repeat rewarded selections, and avoid unrewarded selections, did not appear to be influenced in line324
with the change in corresponding chance levels (33% vs. 50% for chance-level repetition). Although this325
suggested that information was being used in a relatively “high fidelity” manner, this effect was again326
common to both the Social and Individual conditions. Overall therefore we found little evidence of chil-327
dren responding differently to information acquired from a social source compared with that acquired328
individually. The patterns of performance we observed (which included remarkably consistent patterns329
of below-ceiling performance in apparently task-competent individuals) did not appear to reflect a spe-330
cific social learning strategy, but more general learning and motivational biases (see Section 5). Finally,331
children’s overall success rates increased with age, and there were also weak interaction effects: the332
age effect was more pronounced in the Individual condition, suggesting that relative performance in333
response to individual and social information might change with age. We return to this point below in334
Section 3.335
3 Experiment 2: Children’s use of socially and individually ac-336
quired information (China)337
Experiment 1’s results may reflect a real, generalisable, equivalence in how children respond to infor-338
mation acquired socially and individually, once potential confounding factors are stripped away (see339
above). However, an absence of noteworthy differences in a specific sample provides only weak sup-340
port for the conclusion that social and individual information are treated in similar ways, particularly if341
we hope to draw more general conclusions about children’s learning that extend beyond this sample.342
In a study carried out across seven different societies, for example, cross-cultural variation was found343
in children’s rates of repetition of demonstrated actions, versus an alternative, non-demonstrated, re-344
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sponse (van Leeuwen et al., 2018). This study considered only socially acquired information, however,345
so it is not clear whether these cultural differences reflected variation in dependence on social informa-346
tion specifically, or preferences for novelty or exploration not restricted to social learning contexts. Pre-347
vious work has also suggested that societies characterised by the prevalence of particular attitudes and348
cognitive styles may show associated patterns in the relative reliance placed on information acquired349
from social versus individual sources (Mesoudi et al., 2015; Glowacki and Molleman, 2017; Triandis,350
1995; Triandis and Gelfand, 1998; Gelfand et al., 2011). Past literature has focused in particular on351
distinctions in individualism/independence versus collectivism/interdependence (e.g. Triandis, 1995),352
but other dimensions have also been found to differentiate societies in significant ways that might be353
expected to impact on the importance placed on information acquired socially (e.g. horizontal/verti-354
cal, Triandis and Gelfand, 1998; and tight/loose, Gelfand et al., 2011). We therefore attempted to repli-355
cate our results from Experiment 1 using a sample of participants from China, a population of particular356
interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was important to extend the research beyond populations357
typically sampled in human behavioural research (as stressed by Henrich et al., 2010; Nielsen et al.,358
2017). Secondly, adults fromChina had already been reported tomake greater use of social information,359
relative to participants from the UK, in an experimental task (Mesoudi et al., 2015). Finally, Chinese so-360
ciety is generally described as being more “collectivist”/“interdependent” than the UK (Triandis, 1995),361
as well as scoring higher for “tightness” in relation to the importance placed on social norms (Gelfand362
et al., 2011).363
3.1 Methods364
Our methodology was the same as that of Experiment 1. We anticipated a pattern of results which365
replicated those of Experiment 1, i.e. that our results would be independent of sample (as noted above,366
we did not preregister any predictions).367
3.2 Participants368
We recruited 159 children aged 5 and under in Beijing, China (see SI 4 for details). The ethical ap-369
proaches of this study were reviewed and granted approval by the Committee for Protecting Human370
and Animal Subjects, School of Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Peking University.371
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3.3 Results372
Of the 159 children, 40 (25%) located the reward in each of the first five problems of Stage A, and so373
completed no further Stage A problems (see SI 2.2.1 for more details).374
3.3.1 Task success375
As in Experiment 1, our analysis of task success considered only Problems 1–5 of Stage A (see SI 2.2.2376
for analysis of Stage B).377
Task success was above chance (M = 0.73, SD = 0.22, p < .001; SI Table 8). In the Individual condi-378
tion, average task success was 0.55 (SD = 0.39) following rewarded ITs and 0.89 (SD = 0.25) following379
unrewarded ITs. In the Social condition, average task success was 0.57 (SD = 0.39) following rewarded380
ITs and 0.88 (SD = 0.26) following unrewarded ITs.381
Replicating the key findings from Experiment 1, there was no overall effect of source (p = .999).382
Task success was greater following unrewarded ITs compared to rewarded ITs (p < .001), and this was383
more pronounced in older children (information type x age: p < .001). Success increased with problem384
number (p < .001) and with age (p = .012). Unlike Experiment 1, there was no significant interaction385
between source and age (p = .369).386
To investigate any differences in task success between the UK and China samples of children, we387
combined the Stage A problems 1–5 datasets for Experiments 1–2 and repeated the analyses with pop-388
ulation as an additional variable (SI 2.3.1).389
There was no main effect of population (p = .638; SI Table 13). As in the previous analyses for Ex-390
periments 1–2, task success was above chance (p < .001). There was nomain effect of source (p = .605).391
Task success was greater following unrewarded ITs compared to rewarded ITs (p < .001), and this was392
more pronounced in older children (p < .001). Performance improved with problem number (p < .001)393
and with age (p < .001).394
There was a three-way interaction between source, age, and population (p = .021). We followed up395
this interaction by rerunning our models on both the younger and older age groups (see SI Figure 5).396
There was no main effect of source (p≥ .558; SI Tables 14 and 15) or any interactions involving source397
(p≥ .072) in either age group.398
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3.3.2 Repeats399
As in Experiment 1, we also analysed the likelihood of repeating the IT selection in the TT for all problems400
in both stages.401
Overall, the proportion of repeats was 0.37 (SD = 0.40). In the Individual condition, average propor-402
tion of repeats was 0.66 (SD = 0.34) following rewarded ITs and 0.06 (SD = 0.18) following unrewarded403
ITs. In the Social condition, average proportion of repeats was 0.65 (SD = 0.36) following rewarded ITs404
and 0.09 (SD = 0.22) following unrewarded ITs.405
Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, there was no evidence of an overall effect of source406
(p = .701; SI Table 12). Children’s overall rates of repetition were not significantly different between407
Stage A (M = 0.36, SD = 0.24) comparedwith Stage B (M = 0.37, SD = 0.21, p = .067), despite the increase408
in stimuli. There were more repeats following rewarded ITs (Stage A: M = 0.62, SD = 0.34; Stage B:409
M = 0.69, SD = 0.36) compared to unrewarded ITs (Stage A: M = 0.10, SD = 0.22; Stage B: M = 0.06,410
SD = 0.18, p < .001).411
Older children repeated less than younger (p = .001), and this effectwasmore pronounced following412
unrewarded information trials (p < .001). Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no three-way interaction413
involving source, information type, and age (p = .057).414
As above, we combined the Experiment 1–2 datasets and repeated the analyses with population as415
an additional variable (SI 2.3.2).416
There was nomain effect of population (p = .642; SI Table 16). As in the previous analyses for Exper-417
iments 1–2, there was nomain effect of source (p = .577). There weremore repeats following rewarded418
ITs compared to unrewarded ITs (p < .001). Older children repeated less than younger (p < .001), and419
this effect was more pronounced following unrewarded ITs (p < .001).420
Though not evident in the separate analyses of the Experiments 1–2 datasets, there were fewer421
repeats in Stage B relative to Stage A (p = .032), especially following unrewarded ITs (information type422
x stage p < .001); this was particularly the case in the older children (information type x stage x age:423
p = .019). Relative to the UK population, the greater number of repeats following rewarded ITs com-424
pared to unrewarded ITs was more pronounced in the China population (information type x population:425
p = .008).426
Therewas also a four-way interactionbetween source, information type, population, and age (p < .001),427
consistent with the three-way (source x population x age) interaction reported for task success. We fol-428
lowed up this interaction by rerunning our models on the younger and older children separately (see429
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SI Figure 6). In the younger children, there was no effect of source (p = .613; SI Table 17), but there430
was a three-way interaction involving source (source x information type x population: p = .001). There431
were no other interaction effects involving source (p≥ .074). In the older children, there was again no432
effect of source (p = .979; SI Table 18), but there was the same three-way interaction involving source as433
for the younger children, though in the opposite direction (p = .035). There were no other interactions434
involving source (p≥ .216).435
To further investigate the effects of source, information type, population, and age, we considered436
each age group within each population separately, and repeated our analysis. For the UK data, these437
unplanned analyses are those reported in Section 2.3.2, above. In the younger China children, there438
was no main effect of source (p = .985; SI Table 19), but there was an interaction between source and439
information type (p = .013), indicating that the greater tendency to repeat following rewarded ITs rel-440
ative to unrewarded ITs was more pronounced in the Individual condition. In the older China children,441
there was no main effect of source (p = .652; SI 20), nor any interactions involving source (p≥ .319).442
3.4 Discussion443
The results from Experiment 1 were broadly replicated in Experiment 2, suggesting that our findings are444
not culturally specific. In particular, the children recruited in China, like those recruited in the UK, re-445
sponded to information acquired socially and information acquired individually in broadly similar ways.446
In addition, across both populations and common to all age groups (see Figure 2), children were more447
successful following unrewarded ITs, compared with rewarded ones, i.e. they made far fewer lose-448
stay errors, compared with win-shift errors. We further investigate this apparent bias in performance449
in Experiment 3. Direct comparisons between the populations further confirmed that the patterns of450
performance were highly similar, including children’s overall task success, suggesting that the demands451
of the task itself were not culturally specific (see Vu et al., 2017, for an example of the difficulty of452
establishing tasks suitable for cross-cultural comparison, even with adult participants).453
The four-way interaction effect between population, source, information type, and age (on the re-454
peats measure), and the corresponding three-way interaction between population, source, and age455
(success measure), suggested that there may have been population differences in age-related changes456
in response to the different task conditions. This could potentially be interpreted as nascent cultural dif-457
ferences in the use of information acquired socially versus individually, consistent with previous cross-458
cultural studies of social information use (in that the age effect was more pronounced in the Individual459
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condition in the UK population, but not in the China population, e.g. Mesoudi et al., 2015). However,460
although these interactions were in the direction of the UK and China samples differing in directions461
consistent with previous literature to a greater extent in older, compared with younger, children, these462
effects appeared to be driven as much by trends in the opposite direction in the younger children (see463
results of unplanned analyses in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). It is therefore not possible to conclude that464
there are any differences of note between our two recruitment samples in relation to their use of social465
versus individual information for this task. Nonetheless, we believe that our results highlight the need466
for further research clarifying the ontogenetic trajectory of culturally-specific biases towards informa-467
tion acquired socially versus individually.468
3.5 Model: Biased domain-general learning469
In Experiments 1–2, task success increased with task experience (see Sections 2.3.1 and 3.3.1). To in-470
vestigate this relationship further, we used a mathematical model of domain-general learning to anal-471
yse older children’s TT selection sequences. This allowed us to perform a more sensitive evaluation of472
within-task learning effects, by taking into account participants’ biases and personal feedback history.473
Identifying potential biases in participants’ response strategies is particularly challenging in the current474
context, because the sequential nature of the task inherently motivates a degree of exploration (Kael-475
bling et al., 1996) that is difficult to quantify. A solution to this analytical dilemma is to quantify the476
explore-exploit trade-off specific to every individual’s feedback sequence. The statistically optimal re-477
sponse to this trade-off can be cast as a form of Bayesian learning. Modelling within-task learning as478
Bayesian inference (Perfors et al., 2011) allows us to calculate a trial-by-trial benchmark against which479
children’s errors can be compared. See SI 3.2 for model details and analysis.480
We first characterised the predicted increase in task success over trials under the assumption that481
participants were responding to feedback in an unbiased way, i.e. not subject to any a priori preference482
for repeating or deviating from IT selections. Figure 3 (top row) shows that this model fails to predict483
the initial asymmetry in task success between rewarded and unrewarded ITs, and over-predicts task suc-484
cess following rewarded IT selections. We then performed a maximum likelihood analysis to estimate485
the model’s bias parameter from children’s patterns of errors. The biased model dramatically outper-486
forms the unbiased alternative, providing a close correspondence with children’s task success profiles487
(Figure 3, bottom row). Figure 4 shows the biases we inferred. The log-likelihood surface of the ex-488
perimental data characterises the probability of children’s decisions under each possible setting of the489
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model’s biases (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011). In this case, it suggests that to account for children’s490
selection profiles, the model must include an a priori bias against repeating IT selections. Crucially, the491
likelihood surfaces for these biases are highly overlapping when calculated independently from trials492
involving a Social or Individual source. In other words, accounting for each participant’s personal feed-493
back history, and inferring a data-driven estimate of the children’s biases, our analysis is suggestive of:494
(1) a robust preference against repeating IT selections, that is (2) strongest in the context of unrewarded495
ITs, and therefore (3) consistent with an expectation for win-stay, lose-shift reward structures, and (4)496
is independent of source.497
Figure 3: Task success accounting for within-task feedback & learning. Task success across
problem sequences in Experiments 1–2 alongside expected task success under a model of un-
biased (top row) and biased (bottom row)within-task learning. Themodel captures the perfor-
mance profile of a domain-general statistical learner using feedback to induce the underlying
reward structure over problems. Children’s task success profiles are better captured by the bi-
ased model that includes an inherent preference against repeating IT selections. Task success
in both experiments is consistent with the predictions of domain-general learning under an
a priori preference that is gradually overturned by feedback following rewarded IT selections
(left) and reinforced by feedback following unrewarded IT selections (right).
4 Experiment 3: Children’s error patterns in a task with a reverse498
predictive relationship between information and test trials499
Although not part of our original predictions, Experiments 1–2 identified robust error types, across both500
populations and within all age groups. Children made more errors following rewarded ITs compared501
with unrewarded ones, and did so whether they had acquired the information socially or individually.502
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Figure 4: Estimated biases against repeating IT selections. The combined log likelihood of
children’s TT selections (Experiments 1–2, Stage A, children age 4 years and above) under a
model of domain-general learning that accounts for each child’s individual feedback history,
as a function of the model’s bias parameters. Dashed lines show the maximum-likelihood esti-
mate of themodel’s bias. Dottedblack lines at zero denote the unbiased parametrisation. Solid
lines show likelihood surfaces for TT selections following Social information (blue), Individual
information (orange), and both combined (green). In both rewarded (left) and unrewarded
(right) problems, independent of whether the IT included social or individual information, the
likelihood of the experimental data is robustly maximised by a bias against repeating IT selec-
tions. The model’s initial, task-naive preference to repeat IT selections is given by α, and its
willingness to deviate from IT selections is given by (β). The ratio β/α quantifies a preference
to deviate from IT selections. The logarithm of this ratio is larger than zero if β is larger than
α. See SI 3.2 for details.
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They did this in spite of the fact that, broadly speaking, they appeared to correctly infer the predic-503
tive value of the IT, even in the absence of task experience, since task success was above chance from504
the first problem. Children therefore seemed to have implicitly assumed that the reward value of a505
stimulus revealed during the IT would hold true for the subsequent trial of the same problem. This506
was further corroborated by children’s performance on a task which rewarded all TT responses, which507
we carried out as a means of testing children’s expectations about the predictive value of the IT in the508
absence of any differential feedback (Experiment 4; SI 5). The error pattern could be accounted for509
in two main ways. Children might have had greater difficulty using or remembering information ob-510
tained from rewarded ITs compared with unrewarded ones, limiting expression of their knowledge of511
the task structure. Alternatively, childrenmight have accurately encoded the content of the IT, but have512
greater motivation to perform shift responses compared with stay responses, even at the expense of513
task success. This could occur if, for example, children were motivated to maximise their knowledge of514
all potential reward locations, even if this meant selecting a novel stimulus at the expense of forgoing515
a reward.516
The current experiment was designed to tease apart these alternatives by using a task with a re-517
versed reward structure (i.e. using a win-shift, lose-stay contingency) so that the reward’s location was518
in different positions in the IT and TT. Of the two possibilities outlined above, we regarded the second519
as more plausible, i.e. the relatively high occurrence of win-shift errors was due to the children explor-520
ing the space over exploiting the information obtained. Furthermore, we had no particular reason to521
believe that experiencing a rewarded IT would make the task inherently more difficult than an unre-522
warded one. We therefore predicted that for the current reversed reward structure task, shifting errors523
(this time lose-shift) would continue to be more prevalent than staying errors (this time win-stay). We524
preregistered these predictions accordingly (https://osf.io/qtpnm).525
As a secondary goal, this experiment allowed us to further investigate how children learned to use526
information acquired socially versus individually. In Experiments 1–2, our task clearly met children’s ex-527
pectations about the predictive relationship between the IT and TT. Therefore, there was a limit to the528
extent to which we could determine how participants learned to use the information, given that they529
performed above chance from the first problem (see Figure 2, top panels). The current experiment530
therefore offered an opportunity to investigate how effectively children could learn the underlying pre-531
dictive IT/TT relationship using the different sources, given that in this case the relationship deviated532
from their default expectations.533
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We collected data from 184 children aged 5 and under, in Glasgow, UK. We kept the experimental534
procedures as close as possible to Experiments 1–2, aside from the nature of the predictive relation-535
ship between the IT and TT. Therefore even though only Stage A was appropriate for analysis here, we536
included a Stage B with the reversed reward structure so as to use the same instructions as for Experi-537
ments 1–2, and give children and parents/guardians the same expectations of experiment length. We538
did not analyse the Stage B data. Note that in Stage B, and unlike in Stage A and both stages in Exper-539
iments 1–2, the child’s TT selection would influence the position of the reward; not only would it be540
difficult to make any meaningful predictions about how they would behave, but the information in the541
different conditions could not be considered equivalent.542
4.1 Methods543
The design was the same as for Experiments 1–2, except that the reward was located in a different544
position between the ITs and TTs for a particular problem. Therefore in Stage A, if a chosen stimulus545
revealed themonkeyon the IT, the child could find themonkeyon the TTonly by choosing the alternative546
stimulus. If a chosen stimulus revealed no monkey on the IT, the child could find the monkey only by547
re-selecting this stimulus.548
A Stage B was included to keep the experimental procedures as close as possible to Experiments549
1–2. We only analysed the Stage A problems.550
4.2 Participants551
We collected data from 184 children aged 5 and under in Glasgow, UK (see SI 4 for details). The ethical552
approaches of this study were reviewed and granted approval by the General University Ethics Panel of553
the University of Stirling.554
4.3 Results555
In contrast to Experiments 1–2, most of the 184 children completed all 10 Stage A problems without556
achieving five consecutive successful TTs (154 children: 84%; see SI 2.4.1 formore details). We therefore557
analysed all of the Stage A data here.558
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4.3.1 Task success559
Task success was below chance (M = 0.46, SD = 0.21, p = .002; SI Table 21). In the Individual condition,560
average task success was 0.65 (SD = 0.38) following rewarded ITs and 0.31 (SD = 0.35) following unre-561
warded ITs. In the Social condition, average task success was 0.62 (SD = 0.35) following rewarded ITs562
and 0.27 (SD = 0.30) following unrewarded ITs.563
There was no effect of source (p = .279), nor any significant interactions involving source (p≥ .107).564
Unlike in Experiments 1–2, and reflecting the reversed reward structure, task success was greater fol-565
lowing rewarded ITs (p < .001), and this was more pronounced in older children (information type x566
age: p < .001). Success overall increased with age (p = .030). There was no effect of problem number567
(p = .075).568
See SI 2.5 for analysis of task success (and proportion of repeats) for the combined Experiments569
1–3 data with reward structure as an additional variable.570
4.3.2 Repeats571
Although our predictions concerned only the success measure, we also report analyses of the repeats572
variable to determine whether children were responding differently to rewarded and unrewarded ITs.573
Children’s overall rates of repetition were below chance (M = 0.33, SD = 0.28, p < .001; SI Table 22).574
There was a main effect of information type, due to significantly lower proportions of repeats following575
unrewarded (M = 0.29, SD = 0.33) compared with rewarded ITs (M = 0.37, SD = 0.37, p < .001). This was576
particularly evident in older children (information type x age: p < .001).577
Children therefore did respond differently depending on the IT type, although for this task this was578
in the opposite direction to that reinforced by the reward structure (see Figure 2), consistent with their579
success being significantly below chance. As with Experiments 1–2, older children repeated less than580
younger (p < .001), and there was no evidence of an effect of source (p = .907).581
4.4 Discussion582
The results were broadly in line with our predictions. As in Experiments 1–2, children tended to repeat583
previously rewarded responsesmore than previously unrewarded responses. For this task, this occurred584
in spite of the opposite pattern being rewarded. Children thus had lower success rates for this task585
than in the previous experiments. We interpret this as reflecting the fact that the win-stay, lose-shift586
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structure fits better with their prior intuitions about the likely predictive relationship between ITs and587
TTs (i.e. that reward location would not change).588
We also found a sustained overall preference for deviating from a previously selected stimulus in589
this task, as expected. Here, this had the effect of generating lower success following unrewarded ITs,590
compared with rewarded, whereas in the previous experiments children had achieved greater success591
following unrewarded trials. We interpret this pattern as being due to a motivation to explore a novel592
location (consistent with, e.g., Valenti, 1985), regardless of the source of the IT.593
The response patterns identified in the current experiment once again appeared to be robustly594
replicated across both information source conditions, providing no indication social information was595
treated differently from information acquired from personal experience.596
5 General discussion597
Our results provided no evidence to suggest that young children responded to information acquired598
from social observation in fundamentally different ways to information acquired from personal experi-599
ence. Our methodological paradigm made it possible to compare responses to information from these600
two sources in a manner that ensured that the information obtained could be understood to be truly601
comparable. In our task, the information acquiredwas purely episodic (i.e. tied to that specific context).602
Also, if a demonstrator’s behaviour did not lead directly to a reward, this provided a straightforwardly603
contra-indicative signal, and it did so in exactly the same way that feedback from one’s own personal604
exploration should, independent of any assumptions about relative experience or knowledge of either605
actor.606
We did however identify strong biases in how children approached the task, which were common607
across our information source conditions. Firstly, we found that children consistently displayed a bias to608
explore a novel location, rather than repeat the selection made in the IT (consistent with previous liter-609
ature looking at either individual learning only, Levinson and Reese, 1967; Berman et al., 1970; Berman,610
1971; or social learning only, Valenti, 1985). In the tasks with a win-stay, lose-shift reward structure (Ex-611
periments 1–2) this generated poorer performance following rewarded ITs comparedwith unrewarded.612
In the win-shift, lose-stay task (Experiment 3) this generated the opposite pattern in relation to success.613
It is important to note however that the suboptimal performance identified in Experiments 1–2 was614
precisely that (i.e. below ceiling, but nonetheless above chance, including following rewarded ITs). We615
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attribute this to the second robust performance bias, once again common across all datasets, ages, and616
experimental groups. This was the children’s prior expectation of a win-stay, lose-shift structure; their617
performance suggested that they assumed that the location of the reward remained fixed. This meant618
that children tended to repeat previously rewarded responses, and avoid previously unrewarded ones.619
Clearly this reflected a prior bias rather than an effect of the reinforcement contingencies built into620
the task, since it was true even for task-naive participants in Experiments 1–2, and furthermore was621
true for participants in Experiment 3, despite the fact that the reverse pattern (win-shift, lose-stay) was622
rewarded (see also Experiment 4; SI 5).623
In relation to our overarching point regarding the similarities of responses to socially and individu-624
ally acquired information, it is important to emphasise that both of these striking patterns of behaviour625
(i.e. the exploration bias and the expectation of congruent reward location) weremanifested in virtually626
identical ways regardless of source. We did find some interaction effects involving information source627
in Experiments 1–2. However, post-hoc analyses on subsets of the samples failed to identify any group628
exhibiting differences in performance following socially versus individually acquired information. We629
also found some indication of possible differences between the cultural populations in the precise ef-630
fects of source (see the four-way interaction involving source and population for the repeats measure in631
Section 3.3.2). In the older children, this was in a direction consistent with the literature on cultural dif-632
ferences in adult populations in relation to use of information acquired socially vs. individually (Mesoudi633
et al., 2015). We emphasise that our cross-cultural data collection was not designed to investigate the634
ontogenetic roots of population-specific patterns and so do not draw strong conclusions about the (rel-635
atively subtle) differences between populations observed in our datasets. However, we suggest that636
further investigation is warranted based on these findings, and there is potential for future research to637
identify key age ranges at which cultural differences in relative reliance on social information begin to638
appear. On a similar note, future work could also aim to establish the age at, and contexts under, which639
social informationmay be typically prioritised less than equivalent individual information (as suggested640
by the results of, e.g., McElreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2007; Eriksson and Strimling, 2009; Novaes641
Tump et al., 2018).642
Overall, our results offer no support for the view that humans possess (relatively) experience-643
independent learning mechanisms which are specific to social information use (contra, e.g., Meltzoff,644
1988, 1999; Tomasello, 1999; Herrmann et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2007; Hill et al., 2009; Tennie645
et al., 2009; Whiten, 2011; Dean et al., 2014; Henrich, 2016; Tennie et al., 2016). We see no evidence646
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for overall performance differences dependent on information source, and so no evidence that young647
children are particularly attentive to social information. We also see remarkably similar rates of repeti-648
tion following rewarded information in both conditions, and similar rates of repetition following unre-649
warded information in both conditions, within each experiment. There is therefore no evidence here650
that children repeat others’ behaviour, whether reinforced or not, anymore than they repeat their own,651
and there is no evidence that either social or individual learning is more “high-fidelity” than the other.652
This pattern of results is more consistent with the view that mechanisms that appear specialised for653
cultural learning in humans are likely to be relatively experience-dependent, rather than present from654
birth (see Heyes, 2012b, for further discussion). With respect to the cultural transmission of complex655
technology in particular, our results are also consistent with Osiurak and Reynaud (2019), who suggest656
that it is “technical reasoning”, rather than social learning mechanisms, which underpin the acquisition657
of technological cumulative cultural traits. If their theory is correct, then information use would involve658
source-independent learning processes, and so we would not (necessarily) expect social information659
and equivalent individually-acquired information to elicit different responses.660
As noted in the Introduction, social informationmay be prioritised in certain contexts, such aswhere661
it is quantifiably more useful or less risky to obtain, and this may be particularly the case for certain662
traits where naive personal experience may be of limited value, or where the methods of use or func-663
tion (e.g. of a tool) is less immediately transparent. Social information may also be the only means664
of acquiring some traits, such as cultural norms and rituals. But our results suggest that any prioriti-665
sation of social information use, or the human ability to acquire particular cultural traits, is not due to666
some (relatively) experience-independent learning processes which are specific to social information667
use. Similarly, we do not discount humans having, relative to other primate species, strong, relatively668
experience-independent, tendencies to attend to social stimuli (see Heyes, 2018, 2019, for discussion).669
It is possible that humans may have distinctive “input mechanisms” that make social information avail-670
able for learning (even if there is no evidence to support this account in the results we present here),671
but it does not necessarily follow that they also have learning mechanisms which are specific to social672
information use (Heyes, 2012a,b).673
We cannot, of course, rule out there being relatively experience-independent learning mechanisms674
which are specific to social learning use, but that we have failed to capture them in our experiments675
here. It is possible some specifics of our task design led to apparently source-independent patterns676
of behaviour which would not generalise to other tasks. We would welcome follow up work which677
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involved, for example, different presentation media, different numbers of stimuli, or different reward678
structures, along with extensions of this work which consider older or younger participants. It is also679
conceivable, for example, that the patterns of behaviour observed here would not generalise to alter-680
native social learning scenarios, and the future work could involve more complex behaviours so the681
child in a social condition would be exposed to, for example, longer observations of another individ-682
ual, or social demonstrations which they interact with in some way. We would also be keen to see this683
work extended to a less abstract context if, crucially, it were possible for the experimental methodology684
to overcome the limitations of previous work identified above. Given the hypothesis that technologi-685
cal trait acquisition is underpinned by “technical-reasoning skills” (Osiurak and Reynaud, 2019), rather686
than learning mechanisms specific to social information use, it would be particularly interesting if such687
a methodology could assess the use of information for a more tool-like trait. An alternative possibility688
is that the social context of the task common to both our conditions— the child taking part in the pres-689
ence of the experimenter using a tablet computer— influenced information use in both cases in similar690
ways, masking more subtle source-independent differences in information use. We think this unlikely691
due to the fundamental differences in the conditions discussed in the Introduction: if there were social-692
learning-specific responses employed by the children in our samples, we do not believe we would have693
observed such strikingly similar patterns of behaviour between our conditions. Nevertheless, we would694
of course welcome further investigation of the effect of information source in other paradigms where695
the value of the information in both conditions was still comparable.696
Finally, we cannot altogether rule out the possibility that it is the comparable use of (otherwise697
equivalent) social and individually-acquired information that is specific to human behaviour. Other698
species, such as chimpanzees, may make greater use of the individual information even if equivalent699
social and individually-acquired information were available (Tennie et al., 2009; Renner et al., in press).700
Humans may be the anomaly in being able, perhaps through relatively experience-independent so-701
cial learning processes, to make comparable use of social and individual information. The results we702
present here cannot discount this possibility, and future work is necessary to determine whether other703
species do indeed make better use of individually-acquired information than social information when704
the information can be considered truly equivalent. Ongoing work by our research group is aiming to705
establish whether or not this is the case in nonhuman primates, using a similar methodology to the one706
we present here (Renner et al., 2019; Kean et al., in prep.; Renner et al., in prep.).707
In conclusion, we believe that our main finding, i.e. the apparent source independence of the pat-708
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terns of performance, provides good grounds to urge caution in the interpretation of studies of social709
learning. In particular we encourage restraint in proposing adaptive mechanisms which are relatively710
independent of experience, and which assume that effects identified are necessarily specific to social711
information use, particularly in the absence of evidence that socially and individually acquired infor-712
mation is treated differently when that information is truly equivalent. Apparent peculiarities of social713
information use may in fact represent developmental effects of more general biases in learning, which714
would also apply equally to contexts not involving social information use if tested under appropriately715
matched conditions. They may not reflect specialised biological adaptations for the acquisition of the716
contents of cumulative culture.717
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